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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case i&o. 870533-CA 
v. s 
SALVADOR AYALA, I Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute 
For Value, a second degree felony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953 as amended). The conviction occurred 
after a jury trial in the Third District Court, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding. This Courtl nas jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-|2a-3(2) (e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED) ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
Appeal: 
1. Is the affidavit in support t>f the search warrant 
sufficient to establish probable cause bas^d upon the totality of 
the circumstances? 
2. Should the evidence seized ftom defendant be 
admitted on the ground that the search, although presumably for 
weapons, was expanded, based upon the fact that there was 
sufficient probable cause to arrest? 
3. Did defendant have adequate command of the English 
language to fully understand the nature of his Miranda rights and 
to enter a valid waiver thereto? 
4. Were statements made to officer Labrum by 
defendant, after he had invoked his fifth amendment right to 
silence, properly admissible for impeachment purposes? 
5. Were defendant's statements either properly allowed 
under his waiver of fifth amendment privileges, properly allowed 
for use as impeachment, or properly suppressed? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV: 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. V: 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
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Utah Const, art. I, S 14: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden-
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and th^ person or 
thing to be seized. 
Minn. Const, art. I, § 10: 
Sec. 10. Unreasonable searches and 
seizures prohibited. The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, h0uses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the plac^ to be 
searched and the person or thing^ to be 
seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iij) (1953, as 
amended): 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts—Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, 
it is unlawful for any person knqwingly and 
intentionally: 
(ii) to distribute for value or 
possess with intent to distribute for value a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-19(c) (1953, as 
amended): 
(c) No party may assign as epror any 
portion of the charge or omission therefrom 
unless he objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly thp matter to 
which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. Nothwithstanding a party's 
failure to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a Manifest 
injustice. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51: 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such 
earlier time as the court reasonably directs, 
any party may file written requests that the 
court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in said requests. The court shall 
inform counsel of its proposed action upon 
the requests prior to instructing the jury; 
and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of 
its proposed instructions, unless the parties 
stipulate that such instructions may be given 
orally or otherwise waive this requirement. 
If the instructions are to be given in 
writing, all objections thereto must be made 
before the instructions are given to the 
jury; otherwise, objections may be made to 
the instructions after they are given to the 
jury, but before the jury retires to consider 
its verdict. No party may assign as error 
the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto. In 
objecting to the giving of an instruction, a 
party must state distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds for his 
objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing 
requirement, the appellate court, in its 
discretion and in the interests of justice, 
may review the giving of or failure to give 
an instruction. Opportunity shall be given 
to make objections, and they shall be made 
out of the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall 
be made after the court has instructed the 
jury. The court shall not comment on the 
evidence in the case, and if the court states 
any of the evidence, it must instruct the 
jurors that they are the exclusive judges of 
all questions of fact. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Salvador Ayala, was charged with Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute 
for Value, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953, as amended) (R. 3). Prior to trial, 
defendant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on April 14, 1986 
which the Court granted in part and denied in part on July 22, 
1986 (R. 35-36, 91-96). Further, on August 19, 1987, defendant 
filed a Motion to Clarify Court Ruling on Suppression of Evidence 
which was denied in part and granted in part following a hearing 
on September 15, 1987 (R. 128, 205-207). [After a jury trial on 
September 28-29, 1987, in the Third District Court, the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, presiding, defendant was found guilty as 
charged (R. 259-61). A Notice of Appeal was filed in the Utah 
Court of Appeals on December 1, 1987 (R. 270-73). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 14, 1986, Deputy John Conforti of the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office obtained a search warrant for the 
premises of 8853 Julia Lane in the City of Salt Lake, County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah. (Appendix B.) Within seven days 
previous to the issuance of this warrant, Deputy Conforti 
arranged for a Confidential Informant (CI) to make a controlled 
drug buy at the named premises. (Appendix A.) Prior to him 
entering the premises, the CI was given a body search for 
controlled substance and U.S. currency. (Appendix A.) He was 
then given a predetermined amount of money, and subsequently 
observed entering and exiting the house. i/ippendix A.) The CI 
then turned over a quantity of heroin that he stated had been 
purchased in the residence. (Appendix A.) Another body search 
was given, and, again, no controlled substances or U.S. currency 
was found. (Appendix A.) The information obtained through this 
controlled buy was supplemented by an express statement from a 
second Confidential Informant that heroin had been sold out of 
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that specific residence for some time. (Appendix A.) Based upon 
this information, Judge Sheila K. McCleve found sufficient 
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for the premises. 
(Appendix B.) 
On January 15, 1986, pursuant to the search warrant, 
deputies of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, assisted by 
additional police officers, arrived at the residence shortly 
after 9:00 p.m. (R. 285, p. 20). At the time the officers 
arrived and began their search of the home, only a young female 
and her baby were present (R. 285, p.5). During the search, 
Deputy Upton found a .38 caliber pistol under a bed between the 
box springs and the mattress in what has been identified as the 
south bedroom (R. 285, p. 6). In addition, he found .357 caliber 
ammunition in the closet in that same bedroom (R. 285, p«6). In 
the north bedroom, Upton found what was described as two balloons 
or one plastic-like baggie material containing a black tar 
substance suspected to be heroin and a piece of cellophane which 
also had the black tar substance on it (R. 285, p. 8). Also 
found by Upton was a syringe and a silver-colored metal canister 
commonly used to transport narcotics (R. 285, p. 8). 
Approximately one hour after the search began, and 
after Deputy Upton had turned his findings into the evidence 
custodian and was checking the residence for what he though was 
possible stolen stereo and computer equipment, defendant and two 
others arrived (R. 285, p. 11). When defendant entered the 
residence, he exclaimed, "I live here, what's going on?M (R. 285, 
p. 25.) Deputy Conforti initially conducted a search of 
-*_ 
defendant for weapons, and subsequently recovered 96 balloons 
believed to contain heroin and $1,320 in Currency from 
defendant's pockets (R. 285, pp. 26-28) 
Following this search, defendant was specifically asked 
if he understood English, to which he responded affirmatively, 
and Conforti then advised defendant of hi^ Miranda rights (R. 
163). After receiving the Miranda warnings, defendant declared 
that he understood them and opted to remain silent (R. 163) 
Deputy Conforti, as well as deputies Julian, Eyre, 
Labrum, and Rigby, testified that defendant spoke understandable 
English, albeit with an accent (R. 285, pp. 25, 41, 71, 73, 78; 
R. 283, p. 89). Although defendant initially chose to remain 
silent, he returned to Conforti about five minutes after 
receiving the Miranda warnings and initiated further conversation 
regarding the charges and criminal penalties facing him (R. 163). 
In his Minute Entry dated September 23, 19187, Judge Homer F. 
Wilkinson declared that the substance of this volunteered 
conversation was admissible at trial (R. 2t)7). 
Later that evening, Deputy Jay Lfeibrum initiated further 
conversation with defendant (R. 283, pp. 9p-100). The substance 
of this conversation was ruled inadmissible by Judge Wilkinson 
because it was an illegal violation of defendant's Miranda rights 
(R. 207). However, at trial, following defendant's specific 
denial of selling drugs and being the owner of the money found, 
Labrum's testimony of the conversation that he initiated with 
defendant was admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment (R. 
283, pp. 72-83). 
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In addition to the evidence found in the residence 
before defendant's arrival, and the evidence found on defendant's 
person during Deputy Conforti's search of him, $9,550 in currency 
was found in the kitchen drawer and a small package of balloons 
and a bottle of lactose, commonly used as a cutting agent, were 
found in the attic (R. 285, pp. 26, 75). Items found on other 
individuals who arrived at the house after the search began, but 
before defendant arrived, included $7,242 in cash, a hype kit and 
rolling papers, and 23 additional packets of heroin (R. 285, pp. 
51, 62-63). 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of the 
offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute for Value and was sentenced by the Court to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen 
(15) years in the Utah State Prison (R. 267). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant was 
sufficient to establish probable cause for a search of the 
residence based upon the totality of the circumstances test 
advocated by federal cases and applied in similar factual 
situations in other state courts. Although both informants were 
confidential, the controlled buy was completely surveilled by the 
police and the recovery of heroin was supported by a statement 
that heroin was commonly sold at that residence. 
The evidence seized from the defendant was properly 
admissible because at the time of the search, officers had 
already discovered in the residence a weapon, ammunition, two 
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balloons suspected of containing heroin, a syringe, and a 
canister commonly used to transport narcotics. Thus, there was 
probable cause to arrest defendant who had announced that he was 
the resident when he arrived at the home. 
Based on the testimony of several officers, and 
defendant's own actions of never revealing any trouble in 
understanding either the Miranda warnings <>r any other 
conversation, the record shows that defendant had sufficient 
command of the English language to enter a /alid waiver to his 
fifth amendment right to silence. 
Statements made after defendant had invoked his right 
to silence were not admissible for the Stage's case in chief; but 
were clearly admissible for the limited purDOse of impeachment. 
Defendant's statements at trial were directly contradicted by 
previous statements made to the police following an illegal post-
Miranda interrogation. 
All of defendant's statements admitted at trial were 
allowable either because they were made following a proper waiver 
of his Miranda rights, or were used solely for impeachment 
purposes. Any other statements that defendant had previously 
made were properly suppressed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BASED UPON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH 
WARRANT WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE 
CAUSE AND FULLY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
Under the federal interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the test for 
determining the sufficiency of an affidavit for search warrant 
purposes arises from the decision of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983). Prior to this decision, many states strictly adhered 
to the rigid "two-pronged test" of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 
(1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which 
provided that: 
the Fourth Amendment requires that affidavits 
based on informants' tips must set out 
"underlying circumstances" sufficient (1) to 
reveal the basis of informant's knowledge and 
(2) to establish the veracity of the 
informant or alternatively, the reliability 
of his report in a particular case. . . . 
State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). 
However, in 1983, with the decision of Illinois v. 
Gates, the United States Supreme Court held that the Aguilar-
Spinelli test was abandoned, and in its place, the "totality of 
the circumstances" approach would be substituted. Illinois v. 
Gates at 214. In this approach 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply 
to make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit before him, including 
the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of 
persons supplying hearsay information, there 
is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be founp in a 
particular place. . . • 
Id. at 238. 
That this new "totality of the circumstances" has 
completely replaced the Aguilar-Spinelli analysis under the 
federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was reiterated in 
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). In that case, the 
United States Supreme Court stated, "[w]e did not merely refine 
or qualify the 'two-pronged test.' We rejected it as 
hypertechnical and divorced from the 'factual and practical 
consideration of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
men, not legal technicians, act.'" Massachusetts v. Upton at 
732, quoting Brinegar v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
However, even though it is clear that the "totality of 
the circumstances" approach is controlling under a federal 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens points 
out in his concurring opinion in Massachusetts v. Upton, that it 
may be a fundamental error for a state to base its decision 
solely upon the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
without any determination of the law based on its own state 
constitution. Jd. at 735. A similar warning was given by 
Justice Durham of the Supreme Court of Uta^ i in the case of State 
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) when she stated "that despite 
our willingness to independently interpret Utah's constitution in 
other areas of the law, the analysis of st^te constitutional 
issues in criminal appeals continues to be ignored. . . . It is 
imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Coiirt on relevant state 
constitutional questions." State v. Earl ^t 806. 
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There is some evidence that the State of Utah has 
provided a stricter interpretation of Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution than the "totality of the circumstances" 
approach rising from the federal interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment. In State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984) the 
Supreme Court of Utah states that even in light of Illinois v. 
Gates, 
compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli 
guidelines may be necessary to make a 
sufficient basis for probable cause. 
Depending on the circumstances, a showing 
of the basis of knowledge and veracity or 
reliability of the person providing the 
information for a warrant may well be 
necessary to establish with a "fair 
probability" that the evidence sought 
actually exists and can be found where the 
informant states. 
State v. Bailey at 1205 (emphasis added). See also, State v. 
Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985). However, other Utah Supreme 
Court cases have entertained fourth amendment analysis solely 
based on the Illinois v. Gates, "totality of the circumstances" 
test. See State v. Hansenf 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Espinoza# 723 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). 
In his brief, defendant uses the Bailey and Anderson 
cases as the foundation for his argument that the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant is insufficient because it fails to 
comply with the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements. The state submits 
that the case at hand is easily distinguishable from Bailey and 
Anderson and is the type of case described by the court in Bailey 
when it stated: 
In other cases# however, a less strong 
showing of the basis of the affiant's 
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knowledge, veracity and reliability may be 
required, if the circumstances as a whole 
indicate that the informant's report is 
truthful• . • . 
State v. Bailey# at 1205-1206. 
In
 Bailey, the informant was a concerned citizen who 
felt that he was doing his duty in reporting a burglary and 
theft. He asked that his identity remain confidential "[b]ecause 
he feared retaliation and knew that the defendant and his friend 
owned guns," State v. Bailey, at 1204. lr} Anderson/ the 
affidavit was based upon a sheriff's statement that "he had 
received information from a previously reliable informant that a 
wooden fence, . . . would be built on Anderson's property . . . 
for the purpose of concealing marijuana plants being cultivated." 
State v. Anderson/ at 1100. In the case at hand, there is not 
merely a statement from an informant upon which the affidavit is 
based, but rather a controlled buyf supported by a general 
statement of a second confidential informant. (See Appendix A). 
Bailey and Anderson/ while undoubtedly helpful in determining the 
State's approach to the affidavit requirements in a situation 
where there is a simple statement from an informant/ should not 
be unquestionably generalized to include alsituation where there 
has been a controlled buy in addition to an informant's 
statement. 
In arguing this point, the State will use the "sibling 
state approach" outlined in State v. Jewetr, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 
1985) and recommended by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. 
Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986)/ and will refer to the decisions 
of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Coiirt of Minnesota in 
several cases with fact situations parallel to the case at hand. 
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In the first of three important Minnesota cases, State 
v, Hawkins, 278 N.W.2d 750 (Minn. 1979), the affidavit indicated 
that there had been two controlled purchases, the latest 
consisting of the police providing an informant with a sum of 
money which was then passed on to an unwitting informant who made 
the purchase of the controlled substance and then turned it over 
to the original informant, who then gave it to the officers. 
State v. Hawkins, 751. In that case, the definition of a 
controlled purchase is given that: 
A "controlled purchase" involves providing 
money to a buyer, who is searched before and 
after making contact with the seller. It 
also involves police surveillance of as much 
of the transaction between the buyer and 
seller as possible. . . . 
Id. 
In Hawkins, the court determined that it was no1 
necessary to refer to the Aguilar test because of the direct 
police observations of the controlled purchases. Ld. Further 
reference was made to Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause, 25 
Mercer L. Rev. 741, 778: 
When [independent police] observations are 
sufficient in themselves to demonstrate 
probable cause, the final problem is thereby 
solved and all information both from and 
about the informant becomes a redundancy; 
probable cause is established without 
necessary resort to the hearsay." Accord, 
LaFave, Probable Cause from Informants, 1977 
U. 111. L.F. 1, 63. 
Id. 
The court in Hawkins further stated that because the 
police were unable to search the unwitting informant before he 
entered the residence in question, they could not establish 
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the heroin Retrieved came from 
within the residence; but based on the police observations, the 
conclusion that the heroin came from withi^ i the residence was, at 
least, probable, and the affidavit was deemed sufficient to 
obtain the search warrant. Id. at 751-52 
In State v. Aguilar, 352 N.W.2d J395 (Minn. 1984) the 
fact situation was much like that in State v. Hawkins. The 
confidential informant was given a sum of itnoney which was passed 
on to an unwitting informant. The unwitting informant entered 
the residence, returned to the confidential, informant, and gave 
that informant a substance found to be heroin following a field 
test. Based upon this controlled purchase, and information from 
a DEA agent, the affidavit was submitted and a search warrant was 
granted. State v. Aguilar, at 396. The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota, referring to State v. Hawkins and the analysis of 
independent police observation held that tl[ie affidavit in Aguilar 
wcontained sufficient information to establish probable cause." 
Id. 
In the most recent of these thre^ Minnesota cases, 
State v. Valento, 405 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. App. 1987), a 
confidential informant (CI) stated that he ~juld purchase cocaine 
from an unknown source through an unwitting informant (UI). The 
police officer involved met with the confidential informant, 
searched the informant for money and controlled substances, and 
when none were found, he provided the confidential informant with 
money for the purchase. Surveillance was maintained as the CI 
met with the UI, the UI travelled to a residence—unknown until 
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this time—and then the UI returned to the CI. The CI then met 
with the police, gave them what he had received from the UI 
(which was determined to be cocaine), and was again searched for 
money and controlled substances. State v. Valento, at 916. 
In analyzing Valento, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota 
referred to both Hawkins and Aguilar. However, Valento is 
distinguished from Hawkins because there was only one controlled 
buy, and distinguished from both cases because prior to the 
purchase, the police did not even suspect the residence that was 
searched. However, due to police observations and the efficiency 
of the controlled purchase, it was determined that the reasonable 
inference was that the cocaine had come from the residence in 
question and there was probable cause for a search warrant. Id. 
at 918. Also in this case, the Court relies upon the "totality 
of circumstances" approach as derived from Illinois v. Gates. 
Although there is no discussion as to the reason for the use of 
the federal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment rather than a 
direct analysis of the search and seizure provision in the 
Minnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 10, an argument may be 
made that the Court's analysis of this particular issue remained 
the same under Valento and the federal requirements of Illinois 
v. Gates as it did in Hawkins under the Aguilar v. Texas 
approach. This suggests that the Courts of Minnesota did not 
bend their analysis with changing federal interpretation, but 
distinguished their analysis in Hawkins from the prongs of 
Aguilar, and supported their analysis in Valento with the 
applicable totality of circumstances approach of Illinois v._ 
Gates. Thus/ Minnesota may serve as an ejxample of a state that 
has developed its own laws—presumably under the Minnesota 
Constitution—and has determined that in a case such as that at 
hand which includes a confidential informant and a controlled 
purchase, the proper analysis fits perfectly under the totality 
of the circumstances approach and is most likely one of the 
"other cases" spoken of by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. 
Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). 
In the instant case, a detective with the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Narcotics Unit made arrangements with a 
confidential informant to make a controlled drug purchase at the 
residence in question. (Appendix A.) A full body search for 
controlled substances and currency was made on the confidential 
informant and he was then given a specific sum of money with 
which to make the purchase. Jd. The confidential informant was 
under continual observation, except when he was inside the home. 
Id. After he exited the home, the confidential informant gave 
the police what was later identified as heroin. Jd. He was 
again searched for controlled substances and money, and again 
nothing was found. Ld. This controlled purchase was 
supplemented by a general statement from a second confidential 
informant that heroin was sold from the residence in question. 
Id. 
Obviously, the facts in this case are even more 
reliable than those found acceptable in State v. Valento. Here, 
there was no middleman; the confidential informant purchased the 
drugs himself and was subject to a complete search before and 
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after he was in the residence. Also, in this case, the police 
had a specific residence in suspicion before initiating the 
controlled purchase. 
The State submits that under the totality of the 
circumstances approach of Illinois v. Gates, as relied upon in 
State v. Valento, the affidavit contained sufficient information 
to establish probable cause for the search warrant for the house. 
The State further submits that even if the Court wishes to go 
beyond the federal approach and offer a more stringent reading of 
search and seizure requirements based upon the Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 14, it should consider the analysis used in 
Minnesota—under an almost identical constitutional section. 
Certainly, direct police control and observation 
inherent in a controlled buy investigation adds significantly to 
the credibility and basis of knowledge prongs required under the 
Aquilar-Spinelli test. To require more than the care taken in 
this prime example of a controlled purchase situation, may be to 
move away from warrants based on probabilities toward warrants 
requiring substantial proof. An informant's tip or statement may 
necesitate further substantiation to "secure the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 14. However, additional requirements than 
those provided in the instant situation do nothing more in 
protecting citizens' rights. In fact, more requirements may 
discourage the police from so carefully observing and controlling 
a drug buy as they did here in order to satisfy the probable 
cause standard. Instead, the police may t|e encouraged to simply 
use an affiant who can describe well, and who has worked for the 
police an arbitrary number of time in order to establish 
reliability, rather than stage an ideal controlled drug buy with 
a confidential informant, as was done here|, simply so that the 
necessary "prongs" are satisfied. Such a sacrifice of precesion 
police work for statistical achievement should not be 
recommended. 
Defendant further contends that ^he State's failure to 
disclose the names of the confidential intormants relied upon for 
a determination of probable cause also violates his 
Constitutional rights. The State refused to supply the identity 
of the informants because, first, the informants were still being 
used in undercover narcotics investigation^ and disclosure might 
prejudice those investigations, and, seconp, the disclosure is 
not essential to assure a fair determination of the issues. The 
confidential informants were used only in Establishing probable 
cause necessary for obtaining a search warrant. In the case of 
State v. Bankheadf 514 P.2d 800 (Utah 1973), the Supreme Court of 
Utah specifically held that "the courts will not compel 
disclosure of the identity of an informantf who has supplied 
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, where disclosure is 
sought merely to aid in attacking probable cause.M Bankhead, at 
802. See also State v. Sessions, 583 P.2d 44 (Utah 1978). The 
State avers that defendant has not carried his burden of showing 
that the informant was a material witness and urges the Court to 
find that the trial court properly denied defendant's disclosure 
request. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S PERSON 
SHOULD BE ADMITTED BECAUSE THE SEARCH OF 
DEFENDANT OCCURRED AFTER THERE WAS PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO ARREST DEFENDANT. 
The State recognizes that defendant has divided his 
argument concerning the search and seizure into two parts in 
which he argues that 1) his constitutional rights were violated 
because the search was unreasonable, and 2) the seizure was not 
legitimate as part of a pat-down search. The State addresses 
both arguments in one point because if there was probable cause 
to arrest defendant at the time of the search, both the search 
and the subsequent seizure of the questioned items were proper. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Defendant 
submits that this protection leads to "a well established rule 
that a warrant authorizing the search of a premises does not 
extend to authorize the search of a person found on the 
premises." Defendant's Brief at 15. However, in State v. Banks, 
720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986) the Supreme Court of Utah noted 
an important exception when they stated: 
[A] person's mere presence in the company of 
others whom the police have probable cause to 
search does not provide probable cause to 
search that person. United States v. Pi Re, 
332 U.S. 581, 587, 68 S.Ct. 222, 225, 92 
L.Ed. 210 (1948). Nor are police officers 
authorized to search an individual merely 
because that person is present on premises 
for which a search has been authorized, id., 
unless there is some independent probable 
cause to justify a search of the individual. 
CJ.. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 
and n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342-43 and n. 4, 62 
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L.Ed.2d 238 (1979); United States v. Peep, 
490 F.2d 903, 905 (8th Cir. 1974). 
In the case at hand, a no-knock Search warrant had been 
issued for the residence at 8853 West Julia Lane (R. 285, p. 5). 
Approximately fifty minutes following the beginning of the 
search, defendant and two others arrived at the residence (R. 
285, p. 24). Before the arrival of defendant, Deputy James Upton 
had found a .38 caliber pistol, some ammunition, two balloons 
described as Mone plastic-like baggy material containing a black 
tar substance, one piece of cellophane whicfh had a black tar 
substance on it. . .a syringe and a silver colored metal 
canister commonly used to transport narcotics in." (R. 285, pp. 
6, 8, 11.) 
Upon specific questioning, Deputy) John Conforti, who 
subsequently searched defendant, testified that he had been made 
aware of the finding of the firearm before the arrival of 
defendant (R. 285, pp. 23-24). When asked ^hy defendant and his 
two companions were searched upon entering the residence, Deputy 
Conforti explained that "initially the search was conducted for 
our own safety because we had information tjiat there were weapons 
in the house and we'd already located one firearm in the house 
prior to their arrival.- (R. 285, pp. 25-26). 
I 
According to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the 
officers were justified in performing a pat^down search for 
weapons in order to insure their safety. See also Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 
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(Utah 1986). Additionally, it has been written that: 
the courts were willing to permit frisk of 
persons found in or coming to places being 
searched pursuant to warrant even in the 
absence of evidence specifically tending to 
connect those persons with the criminal 
activity under investigation. Rather, it was 
deemed sufficient that the criminal activity 
to which the search warrant relates is fairly 
serious and that the person frisked 
reasonably appears to be an acquaintance of 
the person in possession of the premises. As 
stated by one court, because "it is generally 
known by the police and others that those who 
traffic in large quantities of narcotics are 
often armed," the "mere presence of a person 
or persons in such an environment, presents 
that reasonable suspicion and belief, which 
gives rise to sufficient and legal 
justification to frisk all present for 
weapons." 
LaFave, Search and Seizure, Section 4.9(d) (1982). 
However, defendant does not direct his argument at the 
Terry weapons search; rather, he submits that the $1,320 in 
currency and the 96 balloons of heroin found by the deputy during 
the initial search should be suppressed because the "soft object" 
(R. 285, p. 44) was obviously not a weapon, and any search beyond 
the stop and frisk was beyond that specified in the warrant to 
search the residence. However, in this case, the facts were such 
that probable cause to arrest the defendant had already arisen, 
and the thorough search of the defendant was thereby justified as 
a search incident to an arrest. 
According to the issued search warrant, the purpose of 
the no-knock search was to find "heroin, cutting agents, weighing 
and packaging materials, transactions, ledgers and other related 
controlled substances and/or devices." (Appendix A). This 
warrant was granted because a controlled purchase of heroin at 
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that residence had established probable chuse that evidence of 
the crime of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute for Value might be found at thte residence• (Appendix 
A). Before defendant arrived, the police had discovered a 
weapon, two balloons containing a black t^r substance suspected 
to be heroin, and drug paraphernalia (R. 285, p. 6, 8, 11). Upon 
arriving at the home, defendant stated, "J live here, what's 
going on?" (R. 285, p. 25). 
In a similar case, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 
(1981), the United States Supreme Court said the search warrant 
of a residence implicitly carried with it[the limited authority 
i 
to detain the occupants of the premises iri which a search was 
conducted. Michigan v. Summers, at 701. In that case, the 
police had obtained a search warrant for the premises. The 
police detained the owner of the residence from leaving when they 
began the search, and while he was still being properly detained, 
narcotics were discovered in the home. Id. at 693. The police 
then arrested the owner and in a subsequent search found an 
envelope of heroin on his person, ^d. Justice Stevens said that 
"because it was lawful to require respondeat to re-enter and to 
remain in the house until evidence establishing probable cause to 
arrest him was found, his arrest and the search incident thereto 
were constitutionally permissible." ^d. a^ 692. 
i 
In this case, defendant was not Retained at the 
premises before the search began. However! by the time that he 
arrived and identified himself as a resident of the home, 
i 
sufficient evidence to establish probable cfeause for an arrest had 
been found, and defendant was properly searched. 
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Another inconsistency between the instant case and 
Michigan v. Summers is that in Summers the resident was arrested 
and then searched. In this case, the formal arrest was not made 
until after defendant had been searched and the currency and 96 
balloons had also been found (T. 38). However, this concern was 
specifically addressed in the case of State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 
1380, 1383-84 (Utah 1986). The Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
A search is not invalid, despite the fact 
that it precedes a formal arrest, so long as 
the arrest and the search are substantially 
contemporaneous and probable cause to effect 
the arrest exists independent of the evidence 
seized in the search. E.g., Buick v. United 
States, 396 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1968), 
cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1068, 89 S.Ct. 724, 21 
L.Ed.2d 711 (1969); United States v. Thomas, 
432 F.2d 120, 122 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 1022, 91 S.Ct. 587, 27 
L.Ed.2d 634 (1971). Prior to searching Banks 
and discovering the drug vial in his pocket, 
the officers had discovered other drugs and a 
loaded firearm in the immediate vicinity. 
Thus, the search revealing the drug vial was 
preceeded by probable cause and was therefore 
a valid search incident to arrest. 
In the instant case, a controlled purchase which led to 
the issuance of the search warrant suggested that a resident at 
this home had been selling heroin. When defendant arrived, he 
stated that he lived in the residence and demanded to know what 
was going on. Prior to his arrival, the officers had discovered 
the two balloons containing the black tar substance suspected to 
be heroin, drug paraphernalia, and a weapon. The combination of 
these facts gave Deputy Conforti, who had prepared the affidavit 
and led the subsequent search, reason not only to frisk defendant 
for weapons, but to search defendant as an expansion of the 
search of the residence to a search of the resident incident to 
probable cause for his arrest. 
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In the case of Boyd v. State# 621 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Cr. 
App. 1981), three police officers were infbrmed that narcotics 
were being sold out of a cafe. The office^ surveyed the premises 
and observed an exchange of several small ^in foil bindles for 
cash. Following such an exchange, the officers observed 
defendant in that case leave the establishment and return to his 
car. The defendant was stopped by the officers and two bindles 
were removed from the defendant's pocket. Defendant's contention 
was that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him and 
that the evidence found, two bindles containing heroin, should 
have been suppressed. At trial, the police officer testified 
that he was familiar with the packaging of heroin and 
specifically stated that he was aware that heroin was commonly 
packaged in balloons or bindles. The court found that "[t]he 
observed exchanges of money for tinfoil bindles coupled with the 
officer's knowledge that heroin is normallV packaged in tinfoil 
bindles was sufficient to provide probable cause to believe that 
an offense had been committed." Boyd v. S^ate at 617. 
Therefore, the warrantless arrest was determined to be proper and 
defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. 
In this case, Conforti's knowledge of the general 
situation and his specific narcotics training also support a 
finding of probable cause. Conforti procured the search warrant 
for the house and was involved in the controlled drug buy that 
led to the warrant (R. 285, p. 20; Appendix A). The officer had 
also worked in the narcotics division for Seven months and during 
the previous two and one-half years while he had been working 
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vice, he was also involved in narcotics work and had participated 
in several drug buys—four or five involving heroin (R. 285, pp. 
29-30). He further testified that the heroin had been packaged 
in balloons on each of these occasions (R. 285, p. 31). This 
knowledge is very important because it gave greater weight to the 
evidence that had been found prior to defendant's arrival. 
Conforti knew that there had been a controlled drug by at this 
residence, and he knew the purpose of the search of the 
residence—to find evidence of the possession and distribution of 
narcotics. Obviously, when Deputy Upton found the balloons 
containing the black tar substance, he suspected it of being 
narcotics. Otherwise, he would have had no purpose in taking it 
into evidentiary custody. Conforti's additional knowledge of the 
entire situation and his specific expertise in narcotics 
trafficking offered further significance to the finding. He had 
seen similar packaging of heroin and he was aware that heroin had 
been purchased from the house less than seven days earlier (R. 
285, pp. 29-30; Appendix A). Therefore, when defendant arrived 
and announced his residence, according to the analysis of Boyd v. 
State, the warrantless arrest and search of defendant was 
appropriate based on Deputy Conforti's knowledge of the entire 
situation, his previous narcotics experience, and the evidence 
found in the residence prior to defendant's arrival. 
In his Memorandum of Law in Support of defendant's 
Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause, defendant contends 
that the recent case of State v. Northrup, 83 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 
(Ct. App. filed May 26, 1988) ''compels the conclusion that the 
-26-
the evidence seized from defendant's person was illegally seized 
and should have been suppressed by the trial court as demanded." 
(Memorandum at 2-3). In that case, following the arrest of an 
unwitting narcotics informant/buyer, the pcblice received word 
that someone was leaving the residence in question. They quickly 
stopped the vehicle, but found nothing in their search of the 
driver. The officer, believing that the evidence (marked bills) 
might be destroyed, forcibly entered the residence, conducted a 
protective sweep of the house, patted-down 
found the money that they were looking for 
residents—all before obtaining a search warrant. 
The Court analyzed the issue of Whether or not the 
evidence seized in the pat-down of Northrup was properly admitted 
by use of the independent source analysis dnd the inevitable 
the occupants, and 
on one of the 
discovery doctrine. Under the independent source analysis, the 
Court determined that the officers had no evidence independent of 
their illegal entry which would have given them sufficient 
probable cause to assist and search Northrub. Northrup was 
merely a person within the home that the police illegally 
entered, and, without further ties, was not| sufficiently 
connected to the evidence to establish causb for his arrest. 
inevitable discovery 
the police error, the 
In the Northrup discussion of the 
doctrine, the Court determined that without 
evidence seized in the illegal pat-down search would not have 
been discovered. The police, in Northrup, |iad no specific 
connection to the defendant, so the search warrant, had it been 
obtained, would have been solely for the purpose of searching the 
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residence for evidence relating to the sale of the controlled 
substance retrieved form the unwitting buyer/informant, or, 
specifically, the marked bills. Since the money was on the 
defendant, the officers would not have found it because the 
search was limited to the house. Also, since the defendant could 
not have been specifically connected to the sale of narcotics, or 
the residence in question, a search of his person would have been 
improper. Therefore, the money would not have been inevitably 
discovered, and the pat-down search which followed an illegal 
entry was clearly "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
The State submits that the factual dissimilarities 
between the two cases clearly distinguishes the applicability of 
the Northrup analysis from the issues presented here. In this 
case, officers were legally in the home under a valid search 
warrant before defendant arrived. Also before he arrived, they 
had found a weapon, ammunition, two balloons suspected of 
containing heroin, a syringe, and a canister commonly used for 
transporting narcotics (R. 285, p. 8). The State submits that 
when defendant arrived and identified himself as the resident of 
the house in which the evidence had been seized, the police had 
probable cause based on the evidence already obtained to search 
defendant incident to an arrest. Thus, the search was properly 
given, the evidence was properly obtained, and it should not now 
be suppressed. An analysis of the independent source theory and 
the inevitable discovery doctrine is unnecessary here because the 
entry was legal and defendant was sufficiently connected to the 
residence to allow for his arrest. Admittedly, it would have 
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been more appropriate for the officers tp simply have arrested 
seemingly "expanding" 
ral variance is, at 
defendant prior to the search, instead of} 
the weapons search based on his declaration of residency; but, in 
the light of the presence of probable caiise for arrest, and based 
upon the foregoing argument, this procedi^ 
most, harmless error. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT HAD ADEQUATE COMMAND OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE TO FULLY UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF 
HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS AND TO ENTER! A VALID 
WAIVER THERETO. 
In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436 (1966), the United States Supreme Coupt held that the 
prosecutor may not use statements of a defendant obtained during 
custodial interrogation unless that defendant has been properly 
informed of his rights and has "voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently" waived those rights. Miranda v. Arizona, at 444. 
In this case, defendant had been informed!of his Miranda rights 
to remain silent, to have an attorney retained or appointed, and 
was further informed that anything he said could be used against 
him (R. 285, p. 35). Defendant does not ^uggest that the Miranda 
warnings were not given; rather, defendant contends that he 
-could not speak English well enough to understand the nature of 
his Miranda rights, nor to enter valid waiver thereto." 
(Defendant's Brief at 30). Defendant further points to a 
statement of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
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< 
Circuit in the case of United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 
1235 (9th Cir. 1978) which reads: 
< 
We assume without so holding that if Miranda 
warnings are given in a language which the 
person being so instructed does not 
understand, a waiver of those rights would 
not be valid. .. . 
However, the State submits that in the instant case defendant 
gave ample evidence that he not only understood the warnings, but 
he knowingly and intelligently made decisions based on those 
warnings to initially remain silent and then to personally 
initiate further conversation with the deputy who had given him 
the warning. 
In the case of State v. Bueno, 499 So.2d 362 (La. Ct. 
App. 1986), the defendant claimed that he did not knowingly and 
intelligently waive his Miranda rights because "the rights were 
given to him in English which was his second language." State v. 
Bueno, at 363. However, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana in the 
Fourth Circuit found that evidence that the defendant could 
speak, write, and understand English overcame the claim that 
defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda 
rights because they were given to him in English, which was his 
second language. Ki. at 362. Specifically, the Louisiana court 
pointed to the testimony of the defendant's sister, who said that 
he could speak English and had written her letters in that 
language; the fact that even when the rights were later read to 
him in Spanish, he continued to affirm his understanding in 
spoken English; and the fact that during the entire interrogation 
the defendant never indicated that he did not understand English 
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of the residence. 
285, p. 25). Upon 
and the officers had no difficulty in unae*standing him. :id. at 
364. 
In the present case, there is no hard evidence of the 
fact as to whether defendant can read or wifite in English; 
however, there is an abundance of testimony that defendant easily 
conversed in English during the interrogation which took place on 
January 15, 1986 at the time of the search 
First, Officer John Conforti testified that at the time defendant 
entered the home, defendant's initial exclamation, "I live here, 
What's going on?M# was in English, and thatf. all further 
conversation remained in that language (R. 
being further questioned as to whether defendant spoke in "broken 
English,H Officer Conforti asserted, "No, lje spoke very well but 
with a Spanish accent." (R. 285, p. 41), 
testified that he conversed with defendant for a total of about 
one hour, all responses were in English, arid defendant never gave 
any indication that he had trouble underst4nding (R. 285, p. 48-
49). 
A second officer, Deputy Mike Julian, also testified 
that he heard defendant speaking English for "quite sometime. 
Off and on when I was going throughout the home" (R. 285, p. 71). 
When asked on recross examination if what He heard was "broken 
English," Deputy Julian stated, "it was fairly plain to me. It 
was understandable." (R. 285, p. 73). Andther officer also 
testified that defendant had been heard spdaking unbroken 
understandable English (R. 285, p. 55-56). 
The officer also 
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Concerning the events directly surrounding the time 
when defendant was given his Miranda warnings, Officer Conforti 
testified as follows: 
Q: And where was that that you gave him 
Miranda? 
A: It was in the upstairs rear bedroom. 
Q: Did you inquire as to whether or not he 
understood English? 
A: Yes I did. 
Q: And what was his response as far as that? 
A: He stated that he spoke English and we 
had briefly conversed earlier. 
Q: The rights that you gave him under 
Miranda what did he say in reference to 
those? 
A: He stated that he understood them, but 
that he did not wish to answer questions 
at that time. 
Q: After he made that statement to you did 
you pursue any further questioning with 
him? 
A: Not at that time no. 
Q: Did there come a point in time where he 
returns to talk to you? 
A: Uh yes he asked to speak to me yes. 
Q: When was that after you had given him 
Miranda? 
A: It was about five minutes later. 
(R. 163). 
Although this testimony strongly suggests that 
defendant both understood his Miranda rights and could easily 
converse in the English language, in his testimony in connection 
with defendant's motions to clarify Court's ruling on suppression 
of evidence, defendant asserted that on the night in question he 
was afraid for his life and he tried to u^e what little English 
he knew because he recognized the police as being Americans and 
assumed that no one spoke Spanish (R. 284,1 p. 12). The substance 
of defendant's testimony then is that although defendant could 
speak only very simple English (R. 284, p. 10), his initial 
exclamation and all conversations thereafter took place in 
English. He also directly answered Officer Conforti that he 
understood English and continued to speak in such a manner that 
all of the officers who testified denied that he was speaking 
"broken English.11 Furthermore, defendant jwas able to do this 
ife. In contrast, the 
Mr. Villalobas did not 
even though he admittedly feared for his 1| 
officers found that defendant's companion,! 
speak English, and Mr. Contreras was also only Spanish-speaking 
(R. 285, p. 55, 67). The testimony is conflicting as to whether 
Mr. Medina or both he and defendant were used as translators (R. 
285, p. 55, 67). 
In his brief, defendant points to the case of United 
States v. Beltran, 761 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 19$5) (Defendant 
improperly cites this case as United States v. Elles-Martinez) as 
support of his contention that defendant should have been offered 
his Miranda warnings in Spanish. Defendant states that "even 
though some members of the crew knew some yords of English, the 
government agents dealing with the defendants realized that in 
order to obtain a valid waiver, the defendants must be informed 
of their rights in Spanish." (Defendant's *rief at 31). 
However, the instant case is clearly distinguishable. In 
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Beltran, Spanish was the only language spoken by the crew aboard 
the Panamanian-registered vessel. In this case it has been 
clearly established that defendant was not limited to one 
language and the argument simply concerns the proficiency of his 
understanding of English. 
Defendant seems to confuse the facts of Beltran with 
another case, United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 
1978), in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the 
reading of the Miranda warnings with a Mexican accent to 
defendants who had a Cuban accent did not render the warnings 
inadequate. United States v. Martinezy at 1227. In that case, 
the Court pointed out that although the defendant claims to not 
have understood the officer who read the warnings, he continued 
to converse with him. Id. at 1235. A similar situation occurred 
in the case at hand. Although defendant claims not to have 
understood the warnings, and had an allegedly limited English 
vocabulary, he still returned to the officer to question him 
concerning the charges and possible penalties that were facing 
him (R. 283, p. 43, R. 163). 
The State submits that the evidence clearly points to 
the conclusion that defendant could, in fact, understand English 
with a proficiency that allowed him to comprehend and act upon 
the Miranda warnings given him. He conversed in English, he told 
the officer that he understood English, and at no time did he 
offer any signs that he needed the information given to him in 
Spanish. Surely the simple fact that a person speaks with an 
accent, although the English is understandable, is not enough to 
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require that a translator must be employed. Further, the fact 
that defendant chose silence following th^ reading of the Miranda 
warnings, and then personally initiated a further dialogue with 
Officer Conforti suggests that he understood the rights and then 
reconsidered his options, although he was informed of the 
opportunity for counsel. 
Miranda simply requires that a vfaiver be voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently given. Ther0 is no evidence of 
coercion on the part of the police; defendant admittedly 
approached Officer Conforti and directed an inquiry to him (R. 
283, p. 43, R. 163). As for whether defendant's waiver was 
intelligent, in State v. McKnight, 243 A.2d 240 (N.J. 1968), 
where the defendant had previously been gi^ ven his Miranda 
warnings, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated that H[i]t is 
irrelevant that the prisoner, so advised, chooses to speak 
without counsel because he misconceives hijs need for aid or the 
utility of a lawyer.H State v. McKnight, at at 247. In this 
case, although no interpreter was obtained, defendant was 
apprised of his rights, and he voluntarily waived those rights 
when he chose to approach the officer and inquire further into 
the matter without the assistance or advice of counsel. 
POINT IV 
STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT AFTER HE INVOKED 
HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED FOR IMPEApHMENT 
PURPOSES. 
In a minute entry dated Septembet 23, 1987, the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson ruled on defendant's motion to 
clarify court's ruling on suppression of evidence and stated that 
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"the testimony Ayala volunteered is admissible but the testimony 
obtained as he was interrogated in the police car is not 
admissible." (R. 207). The State concedes that in accordance 
with this ruling, defendant's statements in response to further 
police questioning after invocation of his right to silence were 
inadmissible as part of the State's case in chief. Although, as 
defendant points out in his brief, Officer Conforti's questioning 
of defendant following defendant's invocation of his right to 
silence appears in the record of the preliminary hearing, which 
was attached to defendant's motion to clarify, no such statements 
were elicited form Officer Conforti during the trial, and error 
was thereby avoided. Argument on this point is therefore 
unnecessary. 
However, at trial, Deputy Labrum was questioned 
extensively concerning statements made to him by defendant during 
an illegal post-Miranda interrogation (R. 283, pp. 87-104). 
These statements were not produced for the State's case in chief; 
rather, they were submitted for impeachment purposes in 
conjunction with specific statements made by defendant during his 
testimony. On direct examination, defendant testified as 
follows: 
Q: Mr. Ayala, have you ever sold heroin to 
anybody? 
A: No. 
• • • 
Q: No. Did you ever help anyone else who 
lived at this house sell heroin? 
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A: No. 
• • • 
Q: Was any of the money found msiae the 
house by the police your money, inside 
the house? 
A: No. It was in the kitchen. 
Q: I believe that's what the policeman 
testified. 
A: I would have never left it irt the 
kitchen. 
(R. 283, pp. 51-52). 
The State questioned officer Labrum as to statements made to him 
by defendant, although illegally post-Mirandaf that were in 
direct opposition to defendant's proffered statements. Officer 
Labrum testified that defendant stated that he had been selling 
dope and had acquired approximately $15,000 (R. 283, p. 90). 
Assuming that defendant's statements were inadmissible 
in the State's case in chief under the Fift^ i Amendment, this 
Court may still find that it was not error to admit them in this 
case. Confessions obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966) have long been held admissible for 
impeachment purposes. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); 
Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); United States v. Bowers, 593 
F.2d 376, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1979). This principle was recently 
reaffirmed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1984). The 
policy underlying these decisions is that a defendant should not 
be allowed to use the illegal method by which evidence was 
obtained as Ha shield against contradiction^ of his untruths." 
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1$54). While a 
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defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, the 
privilege does not include a right to commit perjury. Harris, 
401 U.S. at 225. For these reasons, the testimony of Officer 
Labrum which directly contradicted statements and denials made by 
defendant in direct examination were properly admitted, although 
those statements were improperly obtained through post-Miranda 
interrogation. Statements beyond this scope, although mentioned 
in defendant's brief, were not elicited at trial. (See 
Defendant's Brief at 38; R. 283, p. 102). 
In addition, defendant argues that the jury was not 
properly instructed that his unmirandized statements could not be 
used for purposes of determining guilt and were only admissible 
for the purpose of impeachment. However, at the conclusion of 
the trial, the court stated: 
I ask you to get together with the reporter 
and put your exceptions on the record. You 
may do it prior to the jury returning. 
Otherwise you will have waived all rights to 
any exceptions. 
(R. 283, p. 116.) In response, defendant took exception to two 
instructions concerning possession of narcotics, but made no 
reference to the need of a jury instruction concerning the non-
Mirandized statements (R. 283, p. 116). In addition, no such 
instruction was offered in defendant's request for jury 
instructions (R. 215-217). Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure states; 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-19(c) (1953 as amenqed). In State v. 
Valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967) the defendant therein 
appealed his conviction of assault with a deadly weapon on the 
ground that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury 
on the lesser and included offense of simple assault. This 
Court, in upholding the defendant's conviction, stated: 
As a general rule the trial cdurt should 
submit to the jury included offenses where 
the evidence would justify such a verdict. 
But like all general rules, there are 
exceptions and it may depend on the 
circumstances. In this case there was no 
request, either written or oral, for an 
instruction on the lesser offensel of assault. 
We say this advisedly after havinlg examined 
the statements of counsel which defendant now 
argues should be deemed sufficient to 
constitute a request. If the defendant had 
desired that procedure, it was hi s duty to 
submit a proper request in writing, or at 
least to clearly indicate to the pourt orally 
that such was his desire. 
432 P.2d at 54 (emphasis added). In State V. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 
(Utah 1976), a defendant convicted of the theft of copper wire 
claimed error on the ground that the trial Court failed to 
instruct the jury that an honest mistake of fact constituted a 
defense to the charge of theft. This Court, while agreeing that 
an honest mistake of fact was indeed a defense to a charge of 
theft, held that the failure of the defendant to submit a written 
request for such an instruction or to take oral exception to the 
instructions given precluded the defendant £rom asserting as 
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error the failure of the trial court to so instruct the jury. In 
so holding, the Court noted: 
There is an important purpose to be served by 
the rule requiring that objections be made to 
the instructions. It gives an opportunity 
for the court to correct, or to fill in any 
inadequacy in the instructions, so that the 
jury may consider the case on a proper basis* 
In order to accomplish that purpose, the rule 
should be adhered to. Accordingly, the 
standard rule is that when a party fails to 
make a proper objection to an erroneous 
instruction, or to present to the court a 
proper request to supply any claimed 
deficiency in the instructions, he is 
thereafter precluded from contending error. . . . 
545 P.2d at 193 (footnotes omitted). 
As noted above, Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-19(c) (1953 as 
amended) provides that "error may be assigned to instructions in 
order to avoid a manifest injustice." The Utah Supreme Court has 
held in civil cases that the burden of showing special 
circumstances which could warrant a departure from Rule 51 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure precluding consideration of 
Rule 51, Instructions to Jury; Objections: 
"At the close of the evidence or at such 
earlier time during the trial as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file 
written requests that the court instruct the 
jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests. The court shall inform counsel of 
its proposed action upon the requests prior 
to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish 
counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions; unless the parties stipulate 
that such instructions may be given orally, 
or otherwise waive this requirement. If the 
instructions are to be given in writing, all 
objections thereto must be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury; 
otherwise, objections may be made to the 
instructions after they are given to the 
jury, but before the jury retires to consider 
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alleged errors concerning instructions, in the absence of 
objection thereto, rests on the party seeking to vary it. McCall 
v. Kendrickf 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962 (}954): 
Normally the rules themselves mu$t govern 
procedure and are to be followed unless some 
persuasive reason to the contrary invokes the 
discretion of the Court to extricate a person 
from a situation where some gross injustice 
or inequity would otherwise result. The 
burden of showing special circumstances which 
would warrant a departure from the rule rests 
upon the party seeking to vary it. . . . 
>74 P.2d at 963 (footnote omitted). While McCall is a civil 
rase, its analysis of the application of Ri^ le 51 can properly be 
ronsidered in a criminal appeal. Defendani has pointed to no 
special circumstances in his case which woiild warrant this 
Court's departure from Rule 19, and indeed the record in this 
case is void of any such "special circumstances." 
Defendant's failure to make his Request for an 
instruction concerning Utah Code Ann. § 77435-19(c) in writing, 
his apparent waiver of his oral request foij such an instruction, 
defendant's failure to take exception to the trial court's 
failure to so instruct, and his failure to point to "special 
Cont. 
its verdict. No party may assign as error 
the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto. In 
objecting to the giving of an instruction, 
party must state distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds |for his 
objection. Notwithwtanding the foregoing 
requirement, the appellate court 
discretion and in the interests of justice, 
may review the giving or failure to give an 
instruction. Opportunity shall be given to 
make objections, and they shall i\e made, out 
of the hearing of the jury. . • 
in its 
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circumstances" which would warrant a departure from the 
requirements of Rule 19, preclude defendant from asserting error 
on appeal. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS WERE ALLOWABLE BECAUSE 
THEY WERE VOLUNTEERED UNDER A PROPER WAIVER 
OF FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGES, WERE ADMITTED 
FOR LIMITED IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES, OR, WERE 
SUPPRESSED ACCORDING TO THE RULING ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CLARIFY COURT'S RULING 
ON SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. 
The State submits that based on the foregoing arguments 
in Points II, III, and IV, any statements made by defendant that 
were admitted during the trial phase of this proceeding were 
properly entered because they represent volunteered statements, 
knowingly and intelligently given following Miranda warnings; or 
the statements were admitted for the limited use of impeachment. 
Any other statements were effectively suppressed in accordance 
with the Court's minute entry of September 23, 1987 (R. 207). 
The State further submits that defendant's "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" argument is answered by State's Argument, Point 
I, in that the search was proper as a search incident to probable 
cause to arrest. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the State 
respectfully requests that the Court affirm defendant's 
conviction of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with 
Intent to Distribute for Value, a second decree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /( ^ day of July, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney general 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true arid accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Larry R. Keller, attorney for defendant, 257 Towers, Suite 
340, 257 East 200 South - 10, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
day of July, 1988. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
T.t. 'TED" CANNON 
County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4 U I 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAltE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) : $$ 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH KARRAlNT 
BFF0RE: rleanor "Van—Sc-t-ve-f 4S0 South 2nd East 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the premises known as 8853 Julia Lane (3255 South), 
yellow brick, yellow wood on front. White siding on 
sides and a split entry. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
Is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Heroin, cutting agents, weighing and packaging materials, transaction 
ledgers and other related controlled substances and/or devices. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; 
(X) Is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an Item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
(X) consists of an Item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal ccnduct. [Mete requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)) 
fflant believes the property and evidence described above Is 
vidence of the c r U e f s ) of POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH 
STENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE. 
PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts 
• re: 
to establish the grounds for Issuance of a Search 
' » • -
»M 
a d=:ectlve with the Salt Lake County s*.%. Your affiant. 
Narcotics Unit states: 
Your affiant made arrangements for a Confidential l-.f 
to naVe a controlled drug buy at the residence of 8853 Jul*, 
Salt LaVe County. The C.l. was given a body^ search 
of yo 
found. Your 
by detect, »,f°5. 
ur affiant. JT 
•"'•-••• <£, 
i; the Narcotics Unit. under the direction 
• c o n t r o l l e d substances or U.S. currency were 
V^j^ave the C.I. a predetermined amount of money 
\ ^;) Within the last ssv-n (7) days the 
1 v t h e area of 8853 Julia Lane. The C.t. 
residence and exit it a short time later; 
your affiant. The C.T. was never out of t^ 
for when inside the residence of 8853 Julia 
The C.t. turned over to yiur affiant a q u a n t a , 
C.I. stated had been purchased inside the r e s i ^ -
field tested and flashed 
Field Test Kit. • The C.I. 
C.l. was 
w^s observed 
times being reco 
ie visual contact 
Lane) of the 
other detectives 
heroin that the 
The heroin was 
Bectin-Dickinson 
t r a n s p o r t . 
e n t e r i • • J 
a f f i a n r ^J. ft 
positive by use o! 
body search and no controlled substances or 
was again gaven a com;:f.^ 
U S . currency were f ° ^ t 
Your affiant considers the information 
Informant reliable because (if any Information 
unnamed source) ^ ~ 
An o t h e r _ C . J > has 
and has freTn sold out of 
t iroe. 
received from the confidential 
Is obtained fret *• 
stated that drugs.! specifically heroin
 % 
the residence of $853 Julia Lane for %**. 
WHEREFORE, 
seizure of 
the affiant 
said iteas: 
prays that a Search Warrant be issued for t^ .t 
(X) at any time day or night because there Is reason t* 
believe it Is necessary to seize the property P*.ior t 0 l% 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for 
other good reasons, to-wlt: 
It Is further requested that (If appropriate) the officer executive 
the requested warrant not be required to glvel notice of the officer % 
authority or purpose because: 
•ay (X) phys ica l harm « r e s u l t to 
g i v e n ; or 
(X) the property sought may be 
of, or secreted. 
any person If notice were 
quickly destroyed, dispose! 
PAGE THREE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
This danger i s be U ^ e ^ T ^ ^ i I st because: 
Another C.^K—h^srseen on d i f f e r e n t occasions weapons ins ide 
the residence and knows that A handgun i s ins ide the res idence . 
'j r 
/n\ Ji. ^P... 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
AFFIANT . 
t h i s V * dajt-4>f January, 1986. 
V" 
JUD5E IN THE FIFTH CIRCUFT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SMT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH 
APPENDIX B 
T.L: "TED" CANNOH 
County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County* Attorney 
Courtslde Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by 
John Conforti • Salt Lake County Sheriff's Narcotics Division, I am 
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That (X) on the premises known as 88S3 
yellow brick, yellow wood on 
sides and a split entry. 
Julia Lane (3255 South), 
fr^nt. White siding on 
In 
I * 
the 
now 
City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, 
certain property or evidence described as 
State of Utah, there 
Heroin, cutting agents, weighing and packaging materials, transaction 
ledgers and other related controlled substances and/or devices. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or Is unlawfully possessed; 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose 
of committing or concealing a public 
(X) consists of an Item or constitutes 
conduct, possessed by a party to the 
(X) consists of an Item or constitutes 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not 
the illegal conduct. [Note requirements cf 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)1 
to use it as a means 
offense; 
evidence of illegal 
Illegal conduct; 
evidence of illegal 
a party to 
Utah Code 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above Is 
evidence of the crirae(s) of POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH 
INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE. 
PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
to make a ^search of the 
vehlcle(s)f and premises for 
evidence and If you find the same or any 
forthwith before me at the H f t h Circuit Co 
State of Utah, or retain such property In 
the order of this court. 
above-named or described 
the hereln-abbve described 
part thereof, 
person(s)
 f 
property or 
to bring It 
urtf County of Salt Lake, 
your custody, subject to 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated thls/^T da 
JUDGE OF 
y >^f January, 1986. 
FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
